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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DORRIS CYPERT
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
WASHINGrroN COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, SHELDON B. JOHNSON, FINLEY M. JUDD, FREDERICK R. BRUECK, GARY T.
MOORE, DR. WALTER H. SNOW,
1WNALD V. McARTHUR and T.
LAVOY ESPLIN,
Def end ants and Appellarnts.

Case No.
12071

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought to enjoin the issuance and
sale of school building bonds authorized at a bond election held May 27, 1969 brought by Plaintiff and Respondent on behalf of herself and a class of others
similarly situated who are all qualified electors of Washington County School District but who did not pay a
tax on property located therein within the twelve months
preceding the election.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After the trial of the case including the taking of
testimony, arguments by counsel and submitting of
briefs, the District Court rendered its Memorandum Decision (R. 83-87) and entered detailed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law (R. 88-97) and final Judgment
(R. 99-100). The defendants were enjoined from issuing or selling any of the bonds authorized at the May
27, 1969 bond election. In addition, the property tax requirement for voting at bond elections provided for in
Article XIV, Section 3, Utah Constitution, Section
11-14-2 and 11-14-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and any
other Utah constitutional or statutory provision containing similar provisions was declared unconstitutional
as a violation of the United States Constitution. The
court further declared such property tax limitation was
severable from the remainder of the bond election provisions so as to permit a future bond election to be held
where property tax payment is not a prerequisite to
voting. Finally, the court determined that the decision
would apply prospectively only and would not affect
the validity of any bonds issued in this state when the
period for contesting the validity of the bond election
had expired prior to June 16, 1969.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmance of the Judgment of the District Court in its entirety.

2

STAT~J:MENT

OF FACTS

Plaintiff-Respondent accepts the Statement of Facts
of Appellants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROPERTY TAX LIMITATION IN
BOND ELECTIONS FOR ALL TYPES OF
BONDS VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
Al\1ENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
The essential problem of this case is a limitation on
\'Oting, a limitation which amounts to a state classification of qualified resident voters between those who pay
real or personal property taxes and those who do not
pay such taxes. Because of the decision of this court
in Thompson v. City of Centerville, 18 U.2d 174, 417
P.2d 670 (1966) our present statutes and State Constitution make an even stricter classification by allowing the vote only to those persons in whose name on
the assessment list real or personal property taxes are
assessed and denying the vote to spouses of such taxpayers and to persons in whose name taxes are not
assessed even though such persons in fact pay the tax
on the property that is assessed (for example, contract
purchasers of real property).

vV e rely principally on three recent decisions of the

United States Supreme Court: Harper v. Virginia. State

Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 86
S.Ct. 1079 (1966); Kra(rner v. Union Free School District,
395 U.S. 621, 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 89 S.Ct. 1886 (1969);
Cipriano v. City of Hourna, 395 U.S. 701, 23 L.Ed.2d 647,
89 S.Ct. 1897 (1969).
The three cases above referred to establish three
general propositions. First: The political subdivision
or the state may not rely upon the alleged ''reasonableness" of the classification of voters in bond elections
or any presumption of constitutionality of such classification. Second: Is the classification "necessary" to
promote a compelling state interest? Third: If the
classification is necessary, is there a compelling state
interest which overcomes the presumption that denial
of the right to Yote on grounds of wealth is "invidious
discrimination" under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment?
The Supreme Court in the Kram er case, supra, held
that the right to vote is such a fundamental right under
our system of government that any denial of such right
is carefully scrutinized and the normal presumption of
constitutionality does not apply. The court noted that
the basis for the presumption of constitutionality is the
assumption ''that the institutions of state government
are structured so as to represent fairly all the people.''
When this basic assumption is challenged as it is in contesting legislation which denies some people the right
to participate in important public decisions, the assumption cannot be used as a basis for presuming constitu-
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tionality of the questioned statute. (Kramer, supra, 23
L.Ed.2d at 590).
Again in the Harper case, supra, the Supreme Court
stated (16 L.Ed.2d at 173):
Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property,
like those of race ... , are traditionally disfavored.
As Circuit Judge Wisdom stated it in Stewart v. Parish
School Board of the Pa,rish of St. Charles (U.S.D.C., E.
Dist., La; February 25, 1970), 310 F.Supp. 1172:
In other situations, ... the defenders of a statutory classification have the light burden of finding that the legislative scheme has a rational
basis. Here they must meet "the exacting standard of precision'' required of ''statutes which
selectively distribute the franchise.''
Thus the rule established by these cases is that limitations on the right to vote and denials of the right to vote
·will be carefully scrutinized and must be fully justified.
The second proposition - whether the classification is necessary to promote a compelling state interest
- has been the principal area for examination in recent
cases. The basis for this proposition was stated in the
Kramer case as follows :
Statutes granting the franchise to residents on
a selective basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their
lives. Therefore, if a challenged state statute
grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies
the franchise to others, the Court must determine
5

whether the exclusions are necessary to promote
a compelling state interest. (23 L.Ed.2d at 589)
The Kramer case involved a challenge to a New
York Statute providing for school district elections. In
the type of school district operating under the law in
question, a person could vote at the school election only
if he was an owner or the lessee, or the spouse of an
owner or lessee, of taxable real property, or was the
parent or guardian of children currently enrolled in the
public school system. The plaintiff in the Kramer case
was a bachelor who owned no property rendered for
taxation but vrns an otherwise qualified elector of the
school district. The thrust of the statute went to the
right to vote at the annual meeting of the school district
at which eligible voters who were present could vote on
matters of local taxation, could approve the school budget
and in certain instances could vote taxes for school
building purposes.
The arguments articulating the state interest were
first, since it could be reasonably concluded that property taxpayers, and lessees .who have the tax burden
through rental payments, would be more interested because of the effect on their pocketbook, those were the
persons who were primarily interested, plus the parents of children. Second, it was argued that only those
two classes of persons could be expected to understand
the complex questions dealing with school problems
which were to be voted upon, because non-parents were
not as well informed about school problems as were
parents with children in the school system. It was ar6

gued that those electors who paid taxes or rented property, even though they might not have children in school
would sec to it that they obtained the necessary information to intelligently vote on the questions presented at
the school meetings. In discussing the arguments offered on behalf of the state in defense of its classification, the court stated:
\Vhether classifications allegedly limiting the
franchise to those resident citizens "primarily
interested'' deny those excluded equal protection
of law depends, inter alia, on whether all those
excluded are in fact substantially less interested
or affected than those the statute includes. In
other words, the classifications must be tailored
so that the exclusion of appellant and members
of his class is necessary to achieve the articulated
state goal. Section 2012 does not meet the exacting standards of precision we require of statutes
which selectively distribute the franchise. The
classifications in Section 2012 permit inclusion
of many persons who have, at best, a remote and
indirect interest in school affairs and on the other
hand, exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions.
The court then enumerated other classes of persons
who were also denied the right to vote under the New
York law and held that there were others who were also
interested in the school meeting decisions and who were
not permitted to vote, and concluded that since those
denied the right to vote were not substantially less interested or affected, the statute was unconstitutional.
It is to be noted that the court specifically stated that
it did not reach the question of whether the interest pro7

moted by the state in excluding non-taxpayers from voting constituted a compelling state interest which would
escape the taint of "invidious discrimination."
The holding in the Kramer case was a development
of the principle of the Harper case decided in 1966 where
a state poll tax was declared invalid. The Supreme Court
there stated :
We conclude that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or
payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter
qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to
paying or not paying this or any other tax. Our
cases demonstrate that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains
the States from fixing voter qualifications which
invidiously discriminate (16 L.Ed.2d at 172).
The Cipriarno case, decided on the same day as
Kramer, comes closest to the facts of this case in that
a bond election was involved, there a city electric revenue
bond. The applicable Louisiana Statute required approval by a majority in number and amount of the taxpayers qualified to vote who chose to vote at the bond
election. The court, relying principally on the Kramer
case, held that it violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to deny the vote to nontaxpayers. This determination was based on the principle that those excluded from the vote were not substantially less interested or affected than those permitted to vote. For these types of bonds payable from
utility rates and only indirectly affecting property val8

ues and property taxes, there is no justification for differentiating between property taxpayers and non-property taxpayers. This is not to say that property taxpayers have no interest, but only that there is no justifiable reason for excluding non-property taxpayers when
both groups are substantially affected by the operation
of the city-owned electric system.
Coming now to the facts of this case, we are dealing
with a classification under Utah law which allows some
persons to vote at bond elections who have a remote
and indirect interest in school affairs and excludes other
persons, like plaintiff, who have a distinct and direct
interest. Is such a classification "necessary" 1 Under
the Utah statutes and Constitution, spouses, contract
purchasers, senior citizens, and others living with children, or relatives living with children or other relatives,
lessees of property, clergy, military, and others living
on tax-exempt property who are not also assessed with
personal property, and the parents of children enrolled
in the public school system who neither own real or personal property like the plaintiff are prevented from voting at either a revenue bond or general obligation bond
election. Can it be seriously argued that such persons
enumerated above have no interest worth Constitutional
protection in the outcome of a bond election 1 Each of
the classes are substantially interested in and substantially affected by the question of the issuance of bonds
to build school buildings.
Under the classifications drawn by the Utah Constitution and statutes, a person owning an automobile
9

and paying a personal property tax thereon in a significantly small amount may vote at a school bond election,
whereas parents who do not own an automobile and
who rent their residence and have children in the public
schools may not vote at the school bond election, even
though they ultimately pay a property tax because the
rental which they pay for their housing includes a portion of the tax burden. An even greater anomaly is the
contract purchaser of property who in fact pays taxes
on the property but, because the property is not assessed
in his name, is not entitled to vote. See Thompson v.
City of Centerville, supra. The court can take judicial
notice of the fact that the customary form of uniform
real estate contract in this state requires the buyer to
pay the property taxes and can further take notice of
the significant number of real estate transactions handled
under such a form of contract.
The plaintiff has rented a residence in St. George
within the boundaries of the Washington County School
District. The property in which she resides is listed on
the tax rolls of Washington County, Utah. Real property taxes on such property have been paid to Washington County and a portion of these remitted to Washington County School District as provided by Utah law.
Plaintiff pays state income and sales taxes, a portion
of which are returned by the State Legislature to the
Washington County School District.
The Supreme Court in the Kramer case specifically
recognized the interest of lessees of real property, such
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as plaintiff, in the payment of taxes indirectly and also
the interest of non-property taxpayers in the effect on
the general price level of taxes levied by political subdivisions. It is not sufficient therefore to argue that
because those electors who are listed on the tax rolls
and who pay a property tax are the electors who are
"primarily" affected by a bond issue or tax, such state
f'lassifica tions are valid under the requirements laid
down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Kram er and Cipriano cases, supra. The owners of property may have only a slight and minimal interest in the
outcome of a bond election or the levy of taxes, whereas
non-property owning spouses, contract purchasers, lessees and non-property taxpaying parents of children
may have a vital interest in the outcome of the election
and in the quality and structure of public education.
In addition to the question of whether or not the bonds
shall be issued, bond elections present to communities
hasic decisions which can vitally affect the future of
the public education system in the school district. For
example, the passage of a bond election to build a particular school or to complete a particular building program may, because of the status of the debt limit of the
school district under the Utah Constitution, mean that
for many years in the future that school district will
not be able to incur additional bond indebtedness, therefore precluding the issuance of additional bonds for
cliff ercnt or additional building projects. The question
presented to the voters at a school bond election results
in bringing into focus the interests of parents of childrC'n concerning the wise expenditure of the debt incur11

ring power of the school district for one as against another school project. The decision called for at a bond
election can have a substantial effect on the classes of
persons listed above who are now excluded from voting
under the Utah law.
The principal argument of Appellant is that because
property taxpayers can be subjected to a tax to pay the
bonds which are being voted on, there is a compelling
state interest in limiting the vote to such property taxpayers. It is the familiar argument that the one paying
the bill should decide whether the bill should be incurred.
The argument has three basic fallacies: First, that property taxpayers in Utah in fact pay the bill, second, that
all property taxpayers are permitted to vote, and, third,
that the interest of non-property taxpayers in the outcome of bond elections can be ignored.
With regard to the first fallacy, property taxes have
ceased to be the principal support for school districts
and for cities, towns and counties in the state. Schools in
the state receive substantial amounts of state aid and the
source of this state money is largely due from the Uniform School Fund which is made up of a number of
sources including all of the revenues from the corporate
franchise tax, all of the revenues from the individual
income tax, a portion of rentals due the state from
federal mineral leases and by appropriations from the
general fund of the state for which sales tax revenues
provide a major source (See Article X, Section 3, Utah
Constitution; 53-7-1U.C.A.1953).
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According to the publication of the Utah State Board
of Education dated June 25, 1969 entitled Annual Estimated 2\finimum School Report of Utah School Districts
1969-70, it was estimated that the state supported minimum school program in the Washington County School
District would be financed 82% by state funds and approximately 18% by local funds (See also R. 41). Cities,
towns and counties have authority to impose license taxes
and fees (10-8-39, 10-8-80, 17-5-27 Utah Code Annotated
1953), impose sales taxes (Chapter 9, Title 11, U.C.A.
1953) and receive some forms of state aid themselves
(See 27-12-129, 32-1-24 and 41-11-11(2), U.C.A. 1953).
Thus it is the plaintiff and others who don't pay
property tax but who pay state income taxes, sales taxes
and license fees and other charges to local governmental
units who pay a very significant part of the bill for the
support of these local governments including moneys
which may in fact be used for payment of principal and
interest on bonds (approximately $50,000 of state bonding aid funds usable solely for redemption of general
obligation bonds was expected by the Washington County
School District for the 1969-70 fiscal year, Tr. 9; Findings of Fact 9 and 10, R. 91).
Now it is said that it is only the property taxpayers
whose property will be subject to tax to pay the bonds.
It is true that general obligation bonds in Utah contain
a covenant that a property tax sufficient to pay the principal and interest on the bonds shall be levied (See Section 6 of the Bond Ordinance here, R. 36). But this is not
the full story because the same section provides that
13

other funds that may be in the treasury can be used to
pay the principal and interest on the bonds and to that
extent the levy of property tax can be diminished. In
many cases the governmental entity issuing the bonds
fully intends to pay for the bonds out of other revenues
without the levy of the property tax, but issues general
obligation bonds to obtain the lower interest rate such
bonds will command in the marketplace. A recent example is the issue by Salt Lake City of general obligation
bonds for the Hogle Zoo. The bonds will be paid from
gate receipts at the Zoo. Similarly, airport bonds, electric
system bonds, and water and sewer bonds are often issued as general obligation bonds even though the revenues from these facilities ·will in fact be used by the
issuer to pay the principal and interest on the bonds. In
such a case is there not a direct violation of the Cipriano
case if only property taxpayers are permitted to vote on
such a bond?
Consider also that Utah general obligation bonds
typically provide on the face of the bond form itself (See
R. 34) a covenant that the "full faith and credit" of the
issuer is pledged to the payment of the principal and
interest on the bond. It is not simply a pledge of the
property tax revenues of the issuer or a requirement that
a property tax be levied. All of the credit of the issuer
is obligated. Thus, Utah by tradition in its bonding practices and under its bond election laws is different from
Oklahoma, Idaho and Louisiana where property taxes
apparently must be levied in order to pay for the bonds.
Where Article 10, Section 27, and Article 10, Section 35
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of the Oklahoma Constitution specifically require the imposition of a property tax to pay the principal and interest on the types of bonds ref erred to in those sections,
it is perhaps not surprising that the property tax requirement for voting was sustained in Settle v. The City of
Muskogee, (Okla., 1970) 462 P.2d 642 and Settle v. The
Hoard of County Commissioners of the County of Muskogee, (Okla., 1970) 462 P.2d 646. There the imposition
of not only a tax but a new tax is a legal requirement.
Similar provisions of Idaho and Louisiana law were the
basis for the holdings in JJf uench v. Paine, (Ida., 1970)
463 P.2d 939 and H arndy v. The Parish School Board of
the Parish of Acadia, (Ct. App. La., 1970). While we
question these rulings and consider them contrary to the
Supreme Court decisions, they are certainly not direct
precedents against our contentions because Utah has no
such requirement. The three judge District Court inKolodzjejski v. City of Phoernrix, (U.S.D.C. Ariz., Nov. 17,
1969) ______ F.Supp. ______ , had no difficulty in arriving at a
contrary result and applying the Cipriano rule to general
obligation bonds issued in Arizona. Note the similarity
between Title 9, Sec. 782 Arizona Revised Statutes and
the wording of the first sentence of 11-14-2, U.C.A. 1953.
The second fallacy in the argument of Appellants is
assuming that all bill payers for the bonds (which Appellauts equate with property taxpayers) are permitted to
vote. This must be the assumption because it makes little
sense for Appellants to claim that only part of the bill
payers are the only ones entitled to decide whether the
bill should be incurred. Yet this is the dilemma. in which
15

Appellants are placed. It must be conceded that a corporation cannot vote because it is not a qualified elector but
it is well known that corporations pay most of the property taxes in this state. It is clear from Thompson v. City
of Centerville, supra, that the fact of payment of the tax
itself by a contract purchaser or by a wife or husband is
not sufficient if the tax is not assessed in the name of the
one who pays. This leads to the further absurdity that
one in whose name a tax is assessed can vote even though
he pays no tax and will not in the future. Consider also
the non-resident of Washington County School District
who cannot vote even though he is assessed for a tax and
pays it.
The third fallacy in Appellants' basic argument is
ignoring the very substantial interest of non-property
taxpayers in the outcome of the bond election. It seems
to be assumed that because the property taxpayers may
be taxed to pay for the bond, that it follows as night to
day that only they should be permitted to vote on the
bonds. If pecuniary interest is the only constitutionally
significant interest, how can the sales taxes, income
taxes, license fees and other types of revenues paid by
non-property taxpayers be ignored~ But we contend
other interests must also be weighed in the balance. The
interest, here, of plaintiff with a son in junior high
school, concerned with the quality of education her son is
to receive and with the school facilities he is using, is an
interest that cannot be ignored. As the Supreme Court
said in the Harper case :
Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane
to one's ability to participate intelligently in the
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electoral process ... To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant
factor.
When one is concerned with the proper expenditure of
funds for which bonds are to be issued, the concern does
not originate only because of the potential imposition of
a property tax. Of much greater interest to the intelligent citizen is that the new school buildings, the improvements to the airport, the extensions to the electric system,
the new reservoirs for the water system, the new sewage
treatment plant are needed at the time and that the funds
authorized will be wisely used for such purposes. For
such considerations, past payment of property taxes or
future imposition of additional property taxes is completely irrelevant. This is not to minimize the interest of
the property taxpayer in general obligation bond elections, but only to suggest that under the principles of
the Supreme Court cases this interest is not the exclusive
interest in determining the constitutionality of the classification. The non-property taxpayers are as much and in
many cases more interested in the outcome of the election
than the property taxpayer.
But if the court should find that the classification is
"necessary," is there such a compelling state interest
which justifies a denial of the vote? Circuit Judge Wisdom set this question to rest by stating in Stewa,rt v. The
Parish School Boa.rd of the Pa.risk of St. Charles, supra:
The State's compelling interest in fixing the qualifications of voters in school bond elections is to
delegate to the voters in each school district the

17

authority to improve public education in their district. That objective is certainly not promoted by
excluding parents and guardians of school children and others who cannot be characterized as
having a substantially less interest in public education than property taxpayers. In terms of the
effect of the ... election, the excluded groups may
be more seriously affected than the taxpayers,
many of whom have a proper interest in avoiding
arbitrary taxes but little or no interest in public
schools.
Finally, we note that the Cipriano case has already
invalidated the Utah constitutional and statutory provisions as they relate to voted revenue bonds. The cases
of Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P.2d 144 and
JVadsicorth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161,
established what is known as the restricted special fund
doctrine by requiring an election pursuant to Article
XIV, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution for revenue
bonds if the bonds purported to pledge revenues which
theretofore went into general funds of the issuer and
could have been used to reduce property taxes or other
taxes on residents of the issue·r. A property taxpayer
election would be required even though only revenues and
not property taxes are obligated for payment of the
bonds. As conceded by Appellants (Brief p. 22), such a
requirement is contrary to the direct holding of the Ciprian.a case. It appears to Respondent that since Ciprian.a
voids the Utah property tax requirement for Utah revenue bonds, the same rule should be applied for Utah
general obligation bonds since it is the identical constitutional and statutory provisions and the identical limitation of those provisions which apply in both cases.
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POINT II
THE ACTION rs NOT BARRED BY THE 40DAY ELECTION CONTEST PERIOD PROVIDED BY SECTION 11-14-12, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953.
The court below concluded (R. 95) that the 40-day
coutest period of Section 11-14-12, Utah Code Annotated
1953, had not expired on June 16, 1969 when the Cipria;n.o
case was decided. Appellants first argue that because the
Cipriarn.o case applies only to revenue bonds, this conclusion is erroneous or, I suppose more accurately, immaterial. But as we have pointed out in Point I and will
not repeat here, the principles of the Cipriamo case apply
to Utah general obligation bonds as well as to Utah revenue bonds. Knowing that such principles could affect
outstanding bonds and pending plans of governmental
units proposing to issue bonds, the court in Cipriano was
careful to state that the decision would not apply retroactively either to bonds which had been sold or issued
prior to the decision or "where, under state law, the time
for challenging the election result has not expired ... ''
(23 L.Ed.2d at 652). But it follows that the decision will
be applied where, as here, the time for contesting the
bond election had not expired on the date of the Cipria;no
decision.
Appellants next point to the Louisiana cases applying a short statute of limitations to bond election contests.
The basis for any limitation statute is the desire to prevent stale claims from being raised. A short statute of
limitations for election contests has the further important
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purpose of making certain the results of an election at
an early date after the election is held so that public
action can be taken based on the election, such as the
taking of office of the official elected or, in a bond election, the issuance of the bonds. While fully recognizing
the importance of such a principle in the ordinary bond
election where within the 40-day period the United States
Supreme Court has cast Federal constitutional doubts on
the validity of the election, plaintiff here should certainly
be permitted to bring these Federal constitutional questions to the attention of the State courts of Utah. Because
of these constitutional doubts, no bonds have been issued
and no investors have been or will be hurt by the issuance
of the injunction. The school district here involved has
been given new guidelines for the holding of a valid new
election and can now proceed to do so. The purpose of
the short statute of limitations is to safeguard bonds that
have been issued and such purpose is not violated. It was
perhaps because of this that the court in K olodzjejski r.
City of Phoenix, supra, noted non-compliance with Arizona's 5-day statute but nevertheless decided the case.
Also note Handy v. Parish School Board of the Parish
of Acadia, supra, where the court determined the constitutional issues even though holding that the action was
not timely filed.
Furthermore, limitation statutes of this sort do not
Lar constitutional claims. Board of Educatio11 of City of
Aztec 1·. Hartley, 74 N.l\L 469, 394 P.2d 985; Boa.rrl of
Education of Gallup Municipal School v. Robinson, 57
N.~I. 445, 259 P.2d 1028; Taos County Board of Educati:on i:. Sedillo, 44 N.:ir. 300, 101 P.2d 1027: TVliite r.
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Board of Education of Silver City, 42 N.M. 94, 75 P.2d
112. Benedict v. City of New York, 247 Fed. 758, cited
by Appellants (Brief p. 27), is not, when properly analyzed, a contrary holding. There the action was filed
seventeen years after the cause of action had accrued.
While the court threw out the case because of the equitable doctrine of laches and chose not to apply the State
six or ten year statute of limitations, this is a far different case than the 40-day statute of limitations here inrnh'ed.
Finally, and most importantly, the application of the
contest period at most only bars the part of the court's
decision granting the injunction against issuance of the
bonds. It certainly does not bar the relief sought by
plaintiff and granted by the court below declaring the
property tax requirement at bond elections to be unconstitutional. (See Complaint, paragraph B, page 10, R.
10) The question is an important one to resolve because
of the great public interest in this question. The Idaho
Supreme Court in Muench v. Paine, supra, noted the continuing need of school districts in Idaho for additional
buildings, classrooms and other new construction which
can only be met by raising funds from the sale of bonds.
The Idaho Court specifically noted that ''at present, the
bond issues of the State that have been approved are not
salable in the open market." The same facts apply with
equal force in Utah.
POINT III
THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN
HOLDING THAT THE PROPERTY TAX
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REQUIREMENT FOR VOTING IN BOND
ELECTIONS IN THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
ARE SEVERABLE AND THAT DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS ARE AUTHORIZED TO HOLD GENERAL OBLIGATION
BOND ELECTIONS AS LONG AS THE
PROPOSITION IS NOT LIMITED TO TAXPAYERS.
\Ve agree with the argument of Appellants in Point
III and refer the court to Appellants' argument in their
Brief, pages 31-34.
In addition, we wish to point out to the Court the
importance of a determination of this severability point.
A ho1diug that the property tax requirement for voting is
unconstitutional, standing alone, leaves open the question
''where do we go from here?''
One alternative is that no bond elections can be held
and no bonds issued by any city, tovvn, county or school
district because the source of authority for such bond
elections and, indeed, for the very issuance of the bonds
themselves is compliance with Article XIV, Section 3,
Utah Constitution. That being impossible because the
property tax limitation is in violation of the Federal
Constitution, the only alternative is to amend the Utah
Constitution to delete the unconstitutional portion.
The second alternative is to adopt the more rational
approach of the trial court that the property tax limitation itself is severable and the remaining portions of
Article XIV, Section 3 and of onr statutor~' provision:;
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can still be used as the source of authority for the issuance of bonds and the holding of bond elections. The
only difference will be that the unconstitutional part, the
property tax limitation, will be eliminated and bonds
which formerly could only be authorized at property tax
bond elections can now be authorized at elections at which
any qualified voter may vote. It is as if Article XIV,
Section 3 is treated as reading as follows (omitted matter
shown in brackets - added words italicized):
No debt in excess of the taxes for the current year
shall be created by any county or subdivision
thereof, or by any school district therein, or by
any city, town or village, or any subdivision thereof in this state; unless the proposition to create
such debt, shall have been submitted to a vote of
the [such] qualified electors thereof [as shall
have paid a property tax therein, in the year preceding such election,] and a majority of those
voting thereon shall have voted in favor of incurring such debt.

In this manner will be retained the essential purpose of
the framers of the Constitution - that bonds may be
issued by cities, towns, counties and school districts but
only after long term bonds are authorized at an election
by a majority vote of those voting. It would seem unrealistic to assume that the property tax requirement was so
fundamental that the framers would rather have had no
bonds at all rather than bonds issued after an election at
which all qualified electors voted. The severability rule
has been long recognized and applied by all courts (See
16 Am. J ur.2d 409, Constitutional Law, Section 181) and
recognized by this Court (See Smith v. Ca,rbon County,
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95 Utah 340, 81 P.2d 370; Stillnia~z v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540,
192 Pac. 272, 12 A.L.R. 552; Riggins v. District Court,
89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645).
If the contrary result is reached, Article XIV, Section 3, will require amendment. At present our Constitution can be amended only at a general election after
two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the
two houses of the Legislature shall have voted in favor
of submitting the proposed amendment to the electors
and after the proposed amendment has been published
for two months immediately preceding the general election. The next general election is November 1970 and
an amendment would require a special session of the
Legislature to be called in August or prior thereto
(presumably following the decision of this Court). The
Legislature would then pass the proposed amendment
and it would be promptly published so that it could be
submitted in November. If this strict time table is not
reached, no amendment could be considered until November 1972. In the meantime, public projects would
languish because no general obligation bonds and many
revenue bonds could not be issued by any city, town,
county or school district. If for no other reason than
to avoid this result, the declaration of severability should
be affirmed.

POINT IV
ANY DECISION OF THIS COURT
WITH RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY OF
THE BONDS SHOULD BE MADE PROSPECTIVE ONLY.
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We agree with Appellants Point IV and the reasons
for it except that we see no reason to have a different
date than June 16, 1969 as the applicable date for the
decision. This was the date adopted by the trial court
and, of course, coincides with the date of the Cipriano
decision.
As to bonds which have been issued and are in the
hands of holders, we join in the request that this Court
specifically state that any decision will not affect such
bonds which have been actually issued and delivered
prior to the date of this Court's opinion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request
this Court to affirm the decision of the trial court in
its entirety to the end that the uncertainties presently
surrounding the authorization and issuance of general
obligation bonds in this State are resolved at the earliest
possible date. Important public projects are being delayed and will be delayed for an indefinite period in
the future if this Court does not recognize the applicability of the Cipriano,. K rarmer and Harper decisions to
the Utah situation.
Respectfully submitted,
H. R. Waldo, Jr. of
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& McDONOUGH
Attorn,eys for Respondent
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